# BRITISH MANUFACTURING AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

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In May 1981, the British T.U.C. organised a People's March for Jobs. The March commenced in Liverpool on May 1st and for the rest of that month unemployed men and women walked south to London. During that time another 60,000 workers had joined the dole queue as a result of plant closures and the continuing massive run down of manufacturing production in Britain. A rundown that continued through 1981 and saw British industry entering 1982 with its lowest output figure since 1967. In July of that year 5.57 million people were employed in manufacturing, compared with 7.1 million four years earlier. It has been a collapse of dramatic proportions, and one which fits into a general crisis that sees total unemployment in the countries of the OECD rise about 25 million.

Perhaps it was no coincidence that the 1981 march began in Liverpool. Merseyside has been particularly badly hit by the recession. In early 1981 16% of the labour force of the area were unemployed, (and 20% in the city of Liverpool) and it had been reported that there were just 49 jobs on offer for 13,505 youngsters registered unemployed.[1] In 1964, Liverpool was hailed as the "city of change and promise". Its "traditional industries", dependent upon the port were being phased out and replaced by high growth, manufacturing plans from the vehicle and electrical engineering industries.[2] A new city centre was built in celebration and optimism. Cars and Beatles; music and motors - the Detroit of Europe. Today it is a different story. The football team may still be "champions" but the city leads Europe in other, more dramatic ways. It is a graphic illustration of urban dereliction. Everywhere there are empty factories, boarded shop fronts and tracts of wilderness between mean streets. Everywhere people talk about the closure of this or that plant: British Leyland, Dunlop, BICC, Plessey, GEC, Lucas, Girling, Courtaulds, Unilever, Meccano, Tate and Lyle. The list is endless, because every industry has been hit. From the docks to flour milling and telephone equipment; from office equipment to animal foods. Closures. The story is told on people's faces; its forever a topic of conversation in pubs and on pavements. "Anything doing?" "Working?"

In a pub off Colquett Street in 1980 an ex-British Leyland worker put it like this:

> I don't know what's happening. It seems like there's just nothing doing for this town. I've got a mate, works as a tanker driver. Now there's no more secure job than that. Bleeding hell - an oil tanker driver! Well, he's been on short time and now he tells me they're making half the drivers redundant. If that's happening to him I don't know what chance there is for the other BL plant. It's hard to take in at times.

A week later BL announced another cutback in the No. 1 BL plant (it finally closed in 1982). In the same week Burmah Oil announced the closure of its refinery across the Mersey at Ellesmere Port. The Financial Times expert was not surprised. In his view:

> there is little doubt that Merseyside ... will have to come to grips with a smaller workforce. Compared with just under 600,000 in jobs now, it has been forecast that on the most favourable projections the area will be able to sustain only 575,000 jobs by 1968 and the figure could be as low as just under 500,000. (May 8th, 1981)

But in facing such a "jobs crisis", Merseyside is not alone. Perhaps of greater significance is the situation in the West Midlands. Here, in the area around Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton metal manufacture has its home in England. It is a region which gave the name to England as "the workshop if the world". Throughout the twentieth century its people have known prosperity with its industries forming the basis of a growing regional economy. Yet in 1981, John Warburton, director of Birmingham's Chamber of Commerce described how "people in the West Midlands are still shell-shocked by the events of the past twelve months". These "events" were a series of plant closures which had driven the unemployment rate up to 15% Throughout 1980 and 1981 the region lost jobs at a rate of 1,000 a week, and in 1983 the Thatcher government was forced to create a minister with special responsibilites for the area.

Perhaps the city of Coventry provides the clearest example of the scale of the changes affecting this region. In 1976 186,000 people worked in the city, in 1982 the figure had dropped to 150,000. The drop was accompanied by a fundamental change in the structure of employment in the city. In 1976 manufacturing industry provided 57.4% of jobs for the Coventry workforce, in 1982 just 29%. In that area generally, workers and managers from the engineering industry have been made redundant. Many of them are unemployed and disillusioned. Two managers Gerry Read and Robin Wilson worked for W & T Avery which was taken over by GEC and then threatened with closure. They attempted to salvage the operation taking it over themselves. But to no avail. Read put it like this:

> It broke my heart when we had to tell the lads that that was it. We d put everything into that place, it was my whole life. But that was it. I've finished with engineering.

And Wilson:

> Engineering has lost all the experience of people like ourselves and when things pick up they will be paying much more for their products.

Throughout the region several companies have figures prominently in the collapse. Nationalised firms like British Leyland and the British Steel Corporation had major plants in the area and in two years these companies (nationally) reduced their payroll by 40% and 52% respectively. In Coventry, Solihull and Longbridge 40,000 car workers, joined the dole queue. In Bilston, a steel town for 150 years, unemployment went past 30% as the works closed and the plant was sold for scrap. In the private sector GKN, the giant of the mechanical engineering industry, shed 18,000 jobs in 1980 alone, as component factories, screw factories, forges and foundries closed down. By the end of 1981 GKN's Heath Street site in Birmingham had seen its labour force cut from over 2,000 to 965 - all in the space of eighteen months. At GKN Sankey too. Its major Telford plant shed a thousand workers in 1980, and another thousand in 1981. The Manager of Telford Development Corporation, shaken by an unemployment rate of 18% commented: "after last week's announcement by GKN we all lay awake and wondered what the hell to do next."

The context of this man's insomnia is a world recession, and one in which production is being refashioned and organised through the growing internationalisation of capital and company structures. As BL proved its vulnerability in the face of the giant multinational car producers so do British component manufacturers re-order their operations. In this way "shake out" and "run down" in the English Midlands is matched by grant-assisted development elsewhere. Commenting on this new "flexibility" and "competitiveness" of British firms the Sunday Times remarked:

> It is something they have achieved by planning on an international base. As car production has migrated away from the U.K., they have moved with it, taking the jobs with them. "We've grown out of the West Midlands" says one executive, "anyone tied to the fortunes of the local motor industry is now suffering too much."

Other people comment on this "suffering" in different ways. Everywhere though, people ask "what has gone wrong?" and this question becomes quickly replaced by another "why is all this going on and when will it end?"

In this process of questioning, several things have become clear. To begin with, while comparisons are often made with the 1930's, aspects of the present recession are much more disturbing. This is made clear in this assessment of the coal and steel industry by a lodge official of the National Union of Mineworkers. "In the thirties", he argued, "there was hope":

> there were hundreds of pits still working two, three or four days a week. There were little steel works and fairly large ones dotted up and down the valleys. Now we are talking about the total closure of industries in South Wales.[3]

Total - and permanent - closures of plants and industries; that is what accompanies this recession. The British coal industry, apparently reprived after its savaging in the 1960's - is on the edge of crisis. In this, the coal producing regions of Durham and South Wales (once the major exporting coalfield in the world) are most severely threatened. Ironically, in both of these regions major steel plants (at Redcar, Llanwern and Port Talbot) are increasing proportions of imported coke and coking coal. This fact is but one pointer to the underlying changes and that have effected the energy industry. In its statement on the development of the international coal market, the EEC affirmed that:

> as the largest trading entity in the world, and the largest importer of coal, the Community has a vital interest in the promotion of free trade in that commodity.[4]

It was in line with this policy that the Commission (in a view supported by key sectors of the U.K. energy industry) argued for the closure of the "very unprofitable and uncompetitive" pits which produce 40 million tons of coal (15% of EEC capacity). This capacity will be taken up by imports, mined and transported by transnational corporations. This fact has given rise to the fear of a world wide "energy cartel" of private corporations and in dealing with this issue the EEC states its belief that:

> this risk is limited by the natural forces of competition, the flexibile and diversified structure of the world coal market, ... and the existing anti-trust legislation in the main coal-exporting countries.[5]

More than self-interest prompts British miners to ask questions about the role of South African and Australian coal in this new arrangement. As the oil companies talk of converting oil tankers into coal transporter ships, and the EEC considers how port facilities can be "expanded and new ones contacted to cope with larger ships, to provide bigger coal storage areas, and to allow for an increasing number of coal preparation plants", many men ask questions about the logic of this system. As one of them put it:

> we face massive closures in Durham - and the same in South Wales and Scotland - and its not just jobs that will be lost: it will be the sterilisation of millions of tons of reserves. Its hard to get and we know that. But its there. All they want us to do is bury it.

Questions of logic are raised most poignantly in the energy sector (where most clearly questions of "profitability" need to be located in a world of "finite resources") but they don't escape people who work in the steel industry either.

In 1976, over 216,000 men were employed by the British Steel Corporation, today the figure is 94,000 and the prospect is for more major cuts in plants and manpower. In the late seventies plants dotted throughout South Wales, the Midlands and the North (many, like Consett, old but profitable) were closed down in an attempt to concentrate production around five "super-plants". Yet in this ten year period of rationalisation B.S.C.'s share of the U.K. market has dropped by thirty seven per cent to 43 per cent. In the face of steel imports from the Third World, "rationalisation" has produced an increasing cycle of excess capacity, and the continuance of plant closure.

The underlying complexity of the situation becomes clear if we examine the content of these imports and their historical development. In 1964 the Labour Government (in one of its early and rare moments of idealism) set up the Ministry of Overseas Development with Barbara Castle as minister of cabinet rank. Since then the ministry has changed its name and status many times, but in all this (as The Times, pointed out "one fact has stood out: the movement has been downhill all the way". Budgets have been cut, and so too has the nature of its aid. In 1977 (under the "Aid and Trade Provision") the aid was openly tied to the commercial interests of the companies. It was a policy justified by "the aggressive use of aid funds by other donors to support their firms in winning business in developing countries."[6] There have been several consequences of this policy (for example, aid has increasingly been directed away from the poorest to the not so poor countries in the Third World) but what stands out is the way in which "aid" has become a prop to an (often contradictory) restructuring of the world economy. In 1981, for example, the biggest grant in aid given by the U.K. government went to help Davy Loewy obtain a contract to establish a steel mill in Mexico. As The Times pointed out: "at present the government is both financing the steel industry and subsidising the export of steel mills" (7th October 1982)

In July 1982, B.S.C. employed a firm of public opinion consultants to sample its work force asking them if "in their heart of hearts they thought B.S.C. could survive without closing plants". In October the corporation made it known that perhaps two of the super-plants was vulnerable to closure.

The experience of workers in the nationalised sector, is mirrored (magnified even) in the private sector. In 1979, for example the Dunlop; Pirelli company closed its tyre factory at Speke in Liverpool. The Company blamed cheap imports from Eastern Europe for causing a crisis in the tyre market. During the campaign to save the plant, researchers by the General and Municipal Union revealed that the importing company (National Tyre Suppliers) was a wholey owned subsidiary of Dunlop-Pirelli. While the Speke plant had been starved of capital over the whole of the post-war period, the company had been investing in a new plant in Eastern Europe. In order to facilitate such deals, Dunlop had in 1979 moved its Headquarters to Geneva. The move there was described by Ken Gardener, the company's financial director, as a "considerable coup". Headquarters in Geneva free the company from the controls which the Bank of England exercise over internal transactions and, to quote Gardener again, "provides the company with considerable financial flexibility". From Geneva the comapny's holdings in the U.K., the U.S.A., South Africa, Nigeria, Jugoslavia, etc. are balanced, weighted, moved and controlled. A reality which, to quote one shop steward, "the working man cannot really grasp. We just have no information about the kind of things that go on at that level".

As another shop steward put it:

> You are talking about a company that doesn't have a heart. It doesn't have any moral obligation to anybody it employs. Its' run by accountants and professional hatchet men who manipulate and wheel and deal their products irrespective of the human cost involved. It's like playing a great game of monopoly: "Where shall we make tyres this week - give them a pound of rice there, this govenment owes us a favour". I thought you couldn't find a worse company than Dunlop but when you talk to people in other multinational firms you see the same dirty tricks all along the line. I think they must

all go to the same college ... Henry Kissinger or somebody teaching them.

The other side of "permanent closure", therefore is the shifting of capacity from one location to another, often to plants owned by the same company. This has been the pattern with GKN, for example, and it has been pointed to repeatedly by workers, trade union officials and regional government officials as the "export of capital". In the North East of England shop stewards at the Vickers Company documented the incremental shift in the balance of the company's investment profile. This shift has seen Vickers firmly established as a transnational producer (and one of increasing profitability) of an expanding range of light enfineering products in plants throughout Europe. On the Tyne though it has meant closure and redundancy. Whereas the company employed 20,000 workers (mostly skilled men) in its Elswick and Scotswood works in 1945, today Scotswood is closed and the companies entire work force on the Tyne (and those in five factories) is just 2,000.[7] One of the redundant workers put his views of the future in this way:

> Well, let's face it; can you ever see the North East employing all these engineers again? I mean, these factories aren't getting redecorated. They've closed. Finished! I can't see engineering picking up... I think it's finished up here, in fact the way this Government's going it looks as though engineering's going to be finished in England! [8]

And alongside changes like these, the "rules of the game" have been tightened and altered. In 1981 for example, the Financial Times quoted the case of a shop steward:

> Who (having) spent his working life in a factory near London, protested recently that employers no longer play by the rules. He and his fellow workers had been told that if they tightened their belts and rolled up their sleeves, their factory would make a profit and continue to provide jobs and prosperity in its catchment area. They did and the profits duly materialised. But not long afterwards the company announced that the factory would close. It was explained that the plant was in the wrong place for the market it was trying to serve. The work would be moved to mainland Europe. Probably for the first time, it was brought home to workers that the investment strategy of a multinational corporation means, and how powerless his trade union is to oppose it. (Financial Times, 21st January, 1981)

What this example points to are the important changes that are taking place in the relation between capital and labour within the recession. These changes (seen more dramatically in some sectors than others) when taken together add support to the view that the framework of a new international division of labour is being laid out.[9] And in this changing situation it is not only trade union officials and shop stewards who have been slow to react, governments and Departments of State have also been inclined to understand economic policy (within and between states) through the established post-war framework. That such a framework might be inadequate is seen most dramatically in relation to vehicle manufacture: for here the changes since the oil crisis of 1973 has been dramatic indeed.

In Britain, an initial indication of the scale of the change can be obtained by looking at the market for motor vehicles. During the 1960's this market was dominated by the British Motor Corporation whose 40% market share was seen as "traditional" and, to many people, unchangeable. The company had a range of models with respected brand names tied in to a widespread dealership. Amalgamated with Leyland and Triumph, the company seemed strongly placed in an industry whose output increased steadily to 1.92 million vehicles in 1972. But that was to be the high point. Since that year the trend has been steadily downward. In 1980 just a half of those cars were assembled in British plants and the industry's output dropped below a million for the first time since 1958. This collapse has been associated with a dramatic change in the level of competition in the British market. In an expanding market, imported cars took a bigger and bigger share throughout the 1970's, rising to nearly 60% of all sales. Within this Ford had emerged as the market leader. In 1981, while BL's share of the market dipped still further to 18.22%, Ford's peaked to 30.7%. Yet in the 1970's Ford's level of production in Britain dropped; a large proportion of its sales (about half in 1981 and all Capris and Granadas) being imported from its European plants.

This fact alone points to the complexity of the issue involved. For while the question of imports may be the most visible indication of the way things are changing in the motor industry, they are only one part of the picture, maybe more of a symptom than a cause.

# THE NEW WORLD SYSTEM IN AUTO

## The Fiesta: Ford's "Beautiful Baby"




## International Companies in the New System

st Brazilian cars built separately for Europe go
ialy today. Fiat is launching a diesel version
aloon, the smallest diesel-engined car in operation.
ly in Brazil, the newcomer features the body of the
at 147 which has been strengthened to cope with
an roads. (Financial Times, March 3rd 1981)

bitter paradox for Argentinian industrialists,
above all, workers that their country - one of
ead baskets of the western hemisphere - cannot
ingle tractor factory. Three manufacturers,
son, Fiat and John Deere have already shut down
of 1980. The fourth, the Argentine subsidiary of
umboldt - Deutz, is due to close at the end of this
pathetic last flicker of resistance...The Deutz
rkers have appealed to the Vatican to intervene.
Times, December 4th 1980

agen of Germany and American Motor Corporation
ntrolled by Renault of France, have entered into a
rysler Financial, the customer financing arm of
US motor company. Each will pay an undisclosed fee
n the volume of business. (Financial Times,
81)

After 77 years Goodyear Tire and Rubber company is ending production of conventional automobile tires in Akron, Ohio. The phase out will result in the loss of about 730 production and salaried jobs...A new $180 million radial tire production plant at Lauton, Oklahoma will begin operations early next year...(and) within the next few months it will begin production at a $69 million radial tire expansion at its Gadsden, Alabama plant. (Cleveland Plain Dealer Jan.11th 1981)

A delegation from Iran National the state car concern recently visited the VW headquarters in Wolfsburg, but further negotiations are now being handled by one of VW's subsidiaries VW Caminhoes. This company, formerly Chrysler Motors do Brazil...is leading the talks with Tehran over the supply of machinery similar to that used for manufacturing the Colara model, part of the Chrysler do Brazil Dodge range of cars and trucks. (Financial Times, May 5th 1981)

In the late 1960's the locus of automobile production shifted. While investment had been directed away from established centres of production _within_ states, perhaps the most significant change was the orchestration of investment _between_ states. "Ford Europe" symbolised this most clearly. If Ford's plant on the River Rouge (with its integrated production system from iron ore to the car on wheels) was the symbol of Fordism at its height, the modern system contrasts in the way units are dispersed over a vast geographic expanse. Companies have always taken advantage of attractive locational sitings (the availability of grants, loans, cheap labour, etc.) but the new system (integrated as it is by detailed computer control of components and unit production) gives them an added flexibility. To begin with, it lessens their dependence upon _particular_ groups of workers. Ford got beaten in 1941 because all his eggs were in the basket of the Rouge. No longer is this true. Today, Ford's main assembly plants all replicate each other, and production can be switched with some ease from one to the other. Furthermore disagregation - as the process of breaking up "The Rouge" into smaller dispersed pieces has been called - allows the companies to take advantage of variations in labour markets across continents and around the world. Processes requiring skilled labour can more easily be separated from those needing large numbers of untrained workers. In these ways the new system gives added powers to the companies in their dealings on the factory floor and in the market place.

In Europe Ford's British and German companies, while registered as individual and independent entities have through Ford Europe a degree of mutual co-operation described by the company chairman Bob Lutz as "absolute". Based upon the same models and plants, purchasing components through the umbrella company, the arrangement is one which allows them to "have all the benefits of size without the drawbacks". (_Financial Times_, 7th July, 1981).

Furthermore the geographical spread allows Ford to operate in "two domestic markets instead of one", thereby accelerating the advantage it has over companies like BL, Renault and V.W. whose European operations are so strongly based upon the 'domestic' market.

In this way Ford - and to a lesser extent G.M. - had by 1973 united marketing and production in a new form and to its advantage in Northern Europe. It was against this background that Iacocca, when with Ford, had stressed the need to extend the relationship beyond the North.

> We are not Ford Europe. We are Ford of a half of Europe! And that is what we remain as long as we can't provide the cars that the other half wants. We can't go on forever importing foreign workers into Northern Europe. It's time to go and build our cars where the manpower already exists. Let's export the factories and stop importing the men. There is a common market; we should have a common company.[10]

This was the argument which shifted Ford into the small car market and to it establishing an assembly plant for the Fiesta in Spain. Iacocca had sent Dick Holmes, (Ford's man in charge of new Business Opportunities, who was "in Africa one day, in Asia the next and rarely in his office in London") to Spain:

> "listen, Dick, get down to Spain and forget everything else. We now have two top priorities. Brazil and Spain. Spain is your job. You must do everything possible to get Ford into Spain. It's vital." "What will we make there?" "I don't know Taunus Escort, time will tell. The main thing is to get

started. If you succeed, I'll promise you one thing Dick: we'll put our executive building next to the most beautiful beach on the Spanish Coast we'll give you the best office on the top with a view of the sea, and we'll call it the Dick Holmes Building.[11]

The move South became established around the Fiesta assembly plant at Valencia. It was the beginning of a pattern which - in a deepening crisis of over capacity - saw G.M. project and then establish an assembly operation in Spain. Ford's own strategy developed with its projected assembly plant in Portugal. In the American continent this move South was mirrored first by the move out of Detroit into California and the "Sunbelt States" of the South, and then outwards into Mexico.[12] This change was accelerated by the oil crisis and the advent of "the world car".

As the "small car " became established in the U.S. market so too did the possibility of one range of car selling throughout the world. This is the concept which Ford termed "Project Erika" and which led up to the launch of the New Escort. G.M. had a similar project around their "J. car", V.W. product and sell the Golf in Europe, the U.S.A. and Latin America. These cars are "world cars" in the sense that they are both produced and sold globally. The model that is assembled and rolled off the lines at Halewood, is the same as the one which is produced in Genk and in Saarlouis in Germany. It is also produced at two plants in Michigan and by the Mazda Company (in which Ford has a 25 per cent interest) in Japan. Commenting on the project Philip Calwell, Ford Chairman argued that "it is no exaggeration to say that Ford and the auto industry as a whole, are currently engaged in the most massive and profound industrial revolution in peace-time history". While the extent to which this departure represents a radical break with the past (Walter Hayes, Ford vice president of public affairs admitted that "we invented the phrase 'world car' ... because we had to reinforce the faith of the U.S. in the technical ability of our industry" Sunday Times, 28th September 1980) its publicity does serve as a pointer to the established trend within the motor industry. The Escort, built in plants around the world - over a million models a year - draws upon component suppliers globally also. The Escorts assembled at the Wayne plant in Michigan will be made up of the transaxles manufactured in Japan, shock absorber struts from Spain, rear brake assemblies from Brazil, British steering fears, Italian cylinder heads, hub and bearing clutch assemblies from France, door lift assemblies from Mexico, along with Taiwanese wiring and West German valve guide bushings. In this context, the observation of the industry correspondent of The Times was quietly understated:

> Much of the discussion about the threat to the European car industry has centred on Japan ... far less has been said about ... the American companies active in Europe - G.M. and Ford - yet they are much more firmly established than the Japanese and likely to become even stronger in the next decade. G.M. and Ford have both come to realise that national boundaries are irrelevant when rising costs demand the biggest economies of scale (15th August, 1980)

He went on to conclude that "faced with Japanese efficiency on the one hand and the American world car on the other, B.L., Fiat, Renault and the rest of the European manufacturers are in for a tough time. It is a situation that can lead only to more mergers, more government intervention, and, possible, some casualties". He could have added that it was a situation in which the nature of government intervention in economic and industrial affairs becomes more and more problematic. As "disagregation" develops as a basis for location as too does the extent to which sectors of particular national economies form but one part of an international chain of production. Malta's involvement in European vehicle manufacture for example, is based upon the production of boot locks. In Ulster, the region's car industry produces carberetters and seat belts. Here the degree of autonomy available to regional and national planning is extremely limited. And this worsens the move regional (and national) economies develop around branch plants of giant corporations, performing just one stage in an internationally coordinated production process. The North East of England is a good example of this vulnerability. During the 1960's the "traditional" sectors of this old industrial area were run down (almost 100 pits were closed in Durham alone, as 50,000 men left the coal industry encouraged by the prospect of employment in the new manufacturing sector developed in the area). With the incentive of state support, corporations in a range of industries (textiles and clothing, construction, vehicles, light and electrical engineering, food...) moved into the area, joining the N.C.B. and B.S.C. as major employers of industrial workers. In the late seventies the plants closed, and those that closed were disproportionately located in "the corporate sector". In the recession, it was the giant firms (and not the, equally new, "small firm sector") which cut back hard, with devastating effects upon the region's economy. As the author of a recent study points out: "what happens to manufacturing employment depends on the big firms. If you can't do something about them there's nothing you can do about job losses. The small end is quite trivial compared with what happens in giant enterprises".[13]

This is one part of the dilemma. The "new system" also poses problems at another level. In Europe, in manufacturing industry generally and in the acute and particular case of vehicle production there is over capacity. Yet the major producers continue to establish new plants, designed and located in a way which will increase competitiveness and (by implication and necessity) close down other plants. Here the contrast between the technical sophistication (the machinery, the degree of planning and organisation on an international scale) of the internal operations of the major companies, and the chaos of the overall system is most glaring. The new international division of labour is riven with this contradiction, and it reveals itself politically in relations between particular regions and states, as their committees and governments compete with each other for private capital. Within the new production arrangements regions like the North East of England and the North of Egypt have an equivalence as areas of labour supply allied with domestic capital and state support. In the words of the president of the Westinghouse corporation:

> The unschooled girls of Taiwan can do just as well at assembling complex T.V. components as the High School graduates of New Jersey. The untrained workers of Africa or Asian nations can be taught to produce complex products, ranging from tiny transistors to giant turbines as readily as the skilled workers of Philadelphia.[14]

There is no denying this. Nor is there any case (morally or politically) for denying "jobs" to the peoples of Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The danger though (and the reference to "unschooled girls" is perhaps the give-away) is that these new arrangements, orchestrated as they are by private capital, will serve its interests principally. The danger is that we will

<u>all</u> be the looser. The need is for a saner, more coherently thought-out <u>political</u> response to the realities of the emerging system.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Tony Lane, "Merseyside Under the Hammer", Marxism Today, February 1981.

2. For details of this expansion, and the subsequent collapse see Merseyside in Crisis, 1980, available from Merseyside Socialist Research Group, 23 Glover Street, Birkenhead, Merseyside.

3. Alan Baker, quoted in "Where Are We Now: A Roundtable Discussion", Marxism Today, September 1980.

4. The Role for Coal in Community Energy Strategy (Com. 82. Final), p.28. For a criticism of this document see, K. Howells, Brussels and the Future of British Coal, NUM, South Wales Area, 1982.

5. The Role For Coal, p.27.

6. For a criticism of this development, see C. Elliott, Real Aid: A Strategy for Britain, Christian Aid, 1982.

7. For a discussion of the reorganisation of the Vickers Company, see H. Beynon and H. Wainwright, The Workers Report on Vickers, Pluto, 1981.

8. Interview with author, 1980.

9. For a discussion of the variety of processes involved in "job loss" (they identify "rationalisation", "intensification" and "investment and tehcnical change"), see D. Massey and R. Meegan, The Anatomy of Job Loss: The How, Why and Where of Employment Decline, Methuen, 1982.

10. Quoted in Edward Seidler, Let's Call It Fiesta: The Autobiography of Ford's Project Bobcat, Patrick Stevens, 1976, p.41.

11. ibid., p.43.

12. See for example, B. Bluestone, B. Harrison and L. Barker, Corporate Flight: The Causes Consequences of Economic Dislocation, The Progressive Alliance, New York, 1981.

13. David Storey, quoted in the Sunday Times, 3rd October, 1982. His study in Entrepreneuship and New Firms, 1982

14. Quoted in R.J. Barnet and R.E. Muller, Global Research, Simon and Schuster, 1974.